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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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In re J.C.
| 113476 | Delinquency; mandatory transfer; bindover; juvenile; final appealable order; jurisdiction. State’s appeal from a juvenile court’s order on a motion for mandatory transfer (bindover) dismissed, because the order was not a final, appealable order. The order failed to indicate whether the court found probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed several of the acts charged and failed to indicate whether the court granted or denied mandatory transfer. Juvenile court directed to enter a final order as soon as possible. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1883 |
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TMS Ents., Ltd. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| 113259 | Zoning appeal; use variance; nonconforming use; change-of-use application; vested right; spot-zoning. Trial court erred in concluding that property owner did not have a vested right in a prior nonconforming use where evidence showed that the property owner applied for permits to use the property as a business before the zoning classification changed to residential. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1888 |
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State v. Mack
| 112544 | Voluntary manslaughter; R.C. 2903.03(A); aggravated assault; R.C. 2903.12(A); inferior offense; serious provocation; cooling-off period; abuse of discretion; jury instructions; manifest weight; sufficiency; murder; R.C. 2903.01(A) and (B); R.C. 2903.11(A). We affirm Mack’s convictions for two counts of murder and two counts of felonious assault with the accompanying firearm specifications. Her convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not instruct on the inferior offenses of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault because provocation by the victim was insufficient to incite the use of deadly force and Mack had sufficient time to cool off before acting. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1893 |
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In re O.G.
| 113444 | Termination of parental rights; permanent custody; best interest of the child. Juvenile court did not err when terminating the mother’s parental rights and granting custody of the child to the agency. Mother has chronic mental-health issues, including schizoaffective disorder, and developmental delays. Mother did not make enough progress on her case-plan objectives to warrant reunification with her child. Mother was receiving some services at an organization that was not an agency referral, and the court found that the two witnesses that testified from this organization had credibility issues. The guardian ad litem and the agency case worker both recommended that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1884 |
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In re R.M.
| 113443 | Permanent custody; continuance; best interests of the child; hearsay; GAL; oath; ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for continuance where Father was properly served through counsel and Father failed to have contact with counsel for seven months before trial. The reasons for the trial court’s grant of permanent custody were supported by competent, credible evidence. Out-of-court statements were properly admitted as nonhearsay where they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to explain why the child was placed with a foster family instead of relatives. Acceptance of GAL’s unsworn recommendation was not an abuse of discretion where statute does not require the GAL’s recommendation to be under oath and the parties chose not to cross-examine the GAL. Father’s right to the effective assistance of counsel was not violated since there was no evidence of deficient performance and Father could not establish prejudice. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1885 |
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State v. Chappell
| 112935 | Aggravated murder; R.C. 2903.01(A); prior calculation and design; Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; self-defense. There was sufficient evidence to convict appellant of aggravated murder when the evidence at trial showed that she killed the victim with prior calculation and design. The appellant and victim knew each other, had a strained relationship, the appellant had a firearm at her place of employment, and went to grab her purse with the gun in it before pursuing one of the victims outside. The appellant got into an altercation with the victims and then pursued her outside when she came upon the second victim. Appellant unloaded her gun into the second victim’s car, killing her and injuring the first victim. Even though this occurred in a very short time period, there is no bright-line test for determining whether a defendant’s actions show a premeditated decision or studied consideration to kill — each case turns on its own facts, and the facts of this case support a conviction for aggravated murder. The state met its burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not acting in defense of herself or her cousin. The evidence showed that the victims were in the process of leaving when appellant pursued them and ordered them to fight. Although there were two shots fired from inside the car, the testifying expert could not conclude which shot was fired first and the jury believed the state’s witnesses’ testimonies that the victim did not fire first. The jury could consider evidence that the appellant had a firearm unlawfully on work premises when determining whether appellant acted in self-defense. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1895 |
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State v. Gardner
| 113111 | Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i); untimely objections. The trial court did not err in dismissing the appellant’s motion because his objections to the magistrate’s decision were untimely in accordance with Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1897 |
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Cleveland Muni. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Rev.
| 113334 | Administrative appeal; board of revision; R.C. 5717.01; school board; appeal to common pleas court; R.C. 5717.05; R.C. Chapter 2506; standing. The trial court did not err in dismissing the school board’s administrative appeal. The school board did not have standing under R.C. 2506.01 to appeal a decision of a board of revision to the common pleas court. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1887 |
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State v. Carnegie
| 112342 | Evid.R. 803(4); Evid.R. 801(D)(2); Evid.R. 805; hearsay within hearsay; abuse of discretion; admissibility. Trial court abused its discretion where it failed to independently determine whether appellant’s statement to victim, which victim relayed to a medical professional, was admissible under an applicable hearsay rule. The statement was not admissible under Evid.R. 803(4) nor was it admissible as an admission under Evid.R. 801(D)(2). The statement was the sole evidence introduced to establish an essential element of the offense; accordingly, appellant was prejudiced by its admission such that the conviction must be reversed. Nevertheless, in a sufficiency analysis, the reviewing court looks at all the submitted evidence regardless of its admissibility. Here there was sufficient evidence presented as to each element of the offense; accordingly, double jeopardy does not attach to bar retrial. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1892 |
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Cleveland v. Jones-McFarlane
| 113433 | Conceded error; domestic violence; sufficiency of the evidence. The city conceded that defendant’s conviction for domestic violence was not supported by sufficient evidence. Judgment reversed; conviction vacated. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1886 |
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State v. Schall
| 113070 | Res judicata; collateral estoppel; charges tried to the jury; charges tried to the bench; inconsistent verdicts. Where charges of felonious assault, improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises were tried to the jury and having weapons while under disability charge was tried to the bench, jury’s not guilty findings on felonious assault, improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises charges did not preclude defendant’s conviction for having weapons while under disability based on res judicata or collateral estoppel. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1896 |
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Bedford City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision
| 112878 | Administrative appeal; R.C. 5717.01; R.C. 5717.05; R.C. 2506.01; standing; motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); valuation; property; school board. The appellant school board had no standing to appeal a valuation decision made by a county board of revision to the common pleas court when the board did not own or lease the property at issue. We rejected the argument that R.C. 2506.01 conferred standing to appeal. That is a general statute, which is silent as to who has standing to file an administrative appeal. Later-enacted statutes specifically covering these kinds of valuation appeals — R.C. 5717.01 and 5717.05 — clearly prohibit a school board from appealing adverse decisions to a common pleas court when the board is not the property owner or a lessee. Recent amendments to these statutes, which eliminated a school board’s ability to appeal valuation decisions even to the board of tax appeals, further support the conclusion that the legislature’s intent was to eliminate a school board’s ability to appeal these decisions under most circumstances. The trial court correctly dismissed the school board’s appeal, and therefore its judgment is affirmed. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/16/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1894 |
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Smith v. Neff
| 113807 | Writ of prohibition; amended complaint; motion to dismiss; moot; sua sponte dismissal; sealed record; ex parte protection order; misdemeanor; violation of a protection order; subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 2903.214(G)(2); lack of jurisdiction; failure to follow mandate of a superior court; stay of order pending appeal; evidentiary ruling; adequate remedy at law; appeal. A second amended complaint for writ of prohibition was sua sponte dismissed where relator was essentially challenging an evidentiary ruling by the respondent to allow discussion and evidence related to sealed case involving the issuance of a protection order where relator was being prosecuted for violating an ex parte order issued in the sealed case. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, and relator had an adequate remedy at law. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
5/15/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1881 |
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State ex rel. Anderson v. Warrensville Hts.
| 113601 | Public Records Mandamus; writ of mandamus; R.C. 149.43; non-written records request; written records request; moot; statutory damages; duty to accept verbal request; reasonable time; duty to produce records; Civ.R. 10(A). A claim for writ of mandamus in a public records mandamus action was denied as moot where the respondent produced the records during the pendency of the case. A request for statutory damages based on respondent’s failure to accept a non-written records request was also denied because the award of statutory damages requires a written records request. Relator’s request for statutory damages for the written requests was also denied because respondent produced the records within a reasonable time given the broad nature of the request. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/10/2024
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5/16/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1882 |
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State v. Lewis
| 112730 | Sufficiency; manifest weight of the evidence; imposition of sentence on firearm specification; S.B. 201 constitutionality. Sufficient evidence was presented regarding the identity of the perpetrator where a witness who knew appellant identified him from surveillance footage of the incident and other witnesses and DNA evidence connected appellant to the additional crime of leaving the scene of an accident. Additionally, the convictions were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence where the primary witness on identification knew appellant and maintained that identification throughout the case. Although the witness received a favorable plea deal on her charges for testifying in court, the witness identified appellant prior to receiving that deal, there was no evidence of a prior statement that she changed after receiving the deal, or evidence that the witness held animosity towards appellant due to relationship issues. The trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to a firearm specification that was attached to a count that merged based on State v. Bollar, 171 Ohio St.3d 678, 2022-Ohio-4370, 220 N.E.3d 690. Finally, appellant’s sentence under S.B. 201 was not unconstitutional based on State v. Hacker, 173 Ohio St.3d 219, 2023-Ohio-2535, 229 N.E.3d 38. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1786 |
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State v. Kendricks
| 113143 | Crim.R. 32.1, presentence guilty plea withdrawal. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1779 |
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State v. K.L.
| 113168 | Motion to seal record of conviction; R.C. 2953.32; hearing. Ohio precedent that courts need not hold a hearing for ineligible offenders who have filed a motion to seal their record under R.C. 2953.32 is no longer applicable after the April 2023 amendment of the statute. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1777 |
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Cleveland v. Brown
| 113084 | Modification of community-control sanctions; final appealable order. Appeal dismissed. The trial court’s judgment removing a portion of Brown’s community-control sanctions was not a final, appealable order that is reviewable by this court. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1782 |
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Berner v. New Leaf Residential Servs., Inc.
| 112841 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); political subdivision immunity; R.C. Chapter 2744; de novo review; four corners of the complaint; exception to immunity; physical defect of building; notice pleading; sufficient operative facts. The trial court did not err in denying CCBDD’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because both the amended complaint and the crossclaim alleged sufficient facts under which they might plausibly demonstrate that the R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) exception to immunity was applicable. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1788 |
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State v. Moore
| 113041 | Complicity; felonious assault; ineffective assistance of counsel; joinder; Crim.R. 14; severance; Batson; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The appellant’s four assignments of error claiming that error occurred are without merit. Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever under Crim.R. 14; the state’s use of a peremptory challenge did not rise to a constitutional violation, as defined under federal law, based on the prospective juror’s combined race and gender; and the conviction was based on sufficient, credible evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1783 |
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Parnell v. Zielinski
| 112778 | Manifest weight of the evidence; expert witness; stipulated negligence. The defense verdict rendered by the jury was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the verdict was supported by credible and competent evidence that goes to all the essential elements of the case. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1789 |
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McDermott v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| 113123 | Zoning, R.C. 713.15, use variance, R.C. Chapter 2505, R.C. Chapter 2506, administrative appeal, questions of law, “grandfather clause,” C.C.O. 359.01, C.C.O. 329, unnecessary hardship, abuse of discretion. BZA denied a variance to a property owner who built a structure without a permit. The trial court affirmed. After a thorough review of all the evidence in the record, we cannot say as a matter of law that the BZA’s denial of appellant’s requested variance is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record. As such, the trial court did not err in coming to the same conclusion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1780 |
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State v. Washington
| 112872 | Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 32.1; abuse of discretion. Summary: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Washington’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. Washington was not coerced into pleading and a mere change of heart is not sufficient reason to withdraw a guilty plea. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1784 |
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Song v. Rom
| 112770 | Res judicata; claim preclusion; summary judgment; judgment on the pleadings. Appellants’ third lawsuit was barred by res judicata where their original lawsuit was tried to resolution and subsequent litigation attempted to reach the parties involved in the original lawsuit as well as parties in privity with the original parties where the claims arose out of the same transactions that were the basis of the original lawsuit and the claims in the current case could have or should have been raised in the original lawsuit. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1787 |
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State v. K.W.
| 113160 | R.C. 2953.32; application to seal record of conviction; competing interests; abuse of discretion; rehabilitation. The trial court abused its discretion in denying an application to seal a record of conviction where it conflated expungement with sealing a record and therefore improperly weighed the competing interests at play. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1778 |
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State v. Walker
| 113103 | Sentencing; consecutive sentencing; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court complied with the mandates of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and made the findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences, and those findings are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1781 |
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A.E. v. J.E.
| 112847 | Financial misconduct; spousal support; child support; marital property; marital home; temporary spousal support; attorney fees; marital debt; loan; life insurance; proposed shared parenting; parenting time; restraining orders. Trial court erred in finding that husband committed financial misconduct by dissipating marital funds when he liquidated restricted stock units when the court restrained his income and he had no other means of paying his tax liabilities. The trial court erred by ordering husband to pay wife more than half of his income as temporary spousal support. The trial court erred in substituting its own valuation for the marital home based on the court’s review of comparable home values instead of the valuation of husband’s appraiser, who appraised the property one month before trial. Trial court erred in ordering husband to pay wife’s attorney fees when there was no evidence that he was in a superior financial position or that he caused wife to incur an increase in attorney fees. Trial court erred in requiring husband to pay off a loan wife received from her parents when the loan was used to pay college tuitions for the parties’ adult children and to pay real estate taxes on the parties’ marital home, which was wife’s responsibility. Trial court erred in designating wife the beneficiary of a lapsed insurance policy. Trial court erred in not adopting the husband’s shared parenting plan and in finding that a reduction in father’s parenting time was in the child’s best interest. The trial court failed to account for funding missing from wife’s lawyer’s IOLTA account. Trial court erred in leaving all restraining orders in place without specifically identifying the restraining orders and identifying the restrained parties. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/3/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1785 |
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State v. Fips
| 113061 | Manifest weight of the evidence; consecutive sentences. The appellant’s convictions are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences are supported by the record. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1692 |
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W.G. V. D.G.
| 113108 | Distribution of marital property; de facto termination date of marriage; R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b); abuse of discretion; R.C. 3119.82; award of deduction to nonresidential parent. Wife and Husband separated in 2012, and Husband obtained a child support order and paid that order from that time. The parties lived apart and did not intertwine their finances. Husband paid child support from March 23, 2012. The trial court used the date of the child support order as the de facto date of termination of the marriage for the purposes of dividing property and thus awarded Husband his pension, which he obtained interest in after the de facto date of termination. Further, although a disparity in Husband’s and Wife’s reported incomes existed, the trial court awarded Husband the federal tax deductions for their children. The date of termination of marriage is presumed to be the date of the final hearing in the divorce case, but the trial court may select dates that it considers equitable in determining the division of marital property pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto date of termination where the parties’ finances were not intertwined, they did not seek to reconcile the marriage other than for the sake of the children, where the parties lived apart for years, and husband obtained an order for and continually paid child support for over a decade. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto termination date, it did not abuse its discretion by awarding Husband the entirety of his pension where he obtained interest in the pension after the de facto termination date of the marriage. R.C. 3119.82 provides that a court may award the ability to claim children as dependents for federal income tax purposes to a nonresidential parent if the court determines it would further the best interest of the children and payments for child support are substantially current. Wife argued that because she is the residential parent and reported a low income, she could be eligible for tax benefits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Husband the deductions where Wife did not submit tax returns or other documentation to support her financial situation and the trial court could not determine the effect of awarding her the deductions with any certainty. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1690 |
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State v. Jackson
| 113185 | Abuse of discretion; mistrial; discovery; sanction; parole; facility; records; hearsay; exception; nonhearsay; unavailable; harmless error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defense counsel’s request for a mistrial based on an alleged discovery violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion from excluding a recorded jailhouse phone call from evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1687 |
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Master Nails, Inc. v Master Nails Lana, L.L.C.
| 112677 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdictional priority; whole issue; common pleas; domestic relations; divorce; division of property; tort; injunction; temporary restraining order. The plaintiff-corporation filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas seeking injunctive relief and damages for certain alleged torts, including conversion and fraud. The defendants argued that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction by operation of the jurisdictional-priority rule, because there was a pending divorce case in a domestic-relations court between one of the defendants and her husband. That defendant claimed that ownership of the plaintiff-corporation was an issue to be decided in the divorce case. We found that the jurisdictional-priority rule does not apply under the circumstances. The parties and claims were not the same between the two cases. The tort case did not present part of the same whole issue pending in the domestic-relations court. And the domestic-relations court does not have jurisdiction to give the plaintiff the relief to which it may be entitled. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1694 |
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Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C. v. Antonio's Pizza, Inc.
| 113301 | Signatory; arbitration; agreement; jurisdiction; mistake; defense; vacate; appeal; Civ.R. 60(B); confirmation; award; contract. The trial court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant’s motion to vacate the trial court’s confirmation order. The trial court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant’s motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1686 |
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State v. Anderson
| 113159 | Attempted menacing by stalking; maximum prison term; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. The trial court did not err in imposing a maximum prison term where the sentence was within the statutory range and was not otherwise contrary to law. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1688 |
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Forsyth Fin., L.L.C. v. Chaney
| 113099 | Retail installment sales contract; motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); R.C. 1307.01; statute of limitations; Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code; Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1691 |
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State v. Campbell
| 112958 | Shooting; attempted murder; self-defense; Crim.R. 29; manifest weight of the evidence; attempted murder; felonious assault; transferred intent; authentication; firearm specifications; consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. The weight of the evidence supported the convictions. A self-defense claim is generally an issue of credibility and the jury’s decision to believe the defendant’s self-defense as to one victim but not the other victim was not incredible. Under the theory of transferred intent, the felonious assault convictions as to the remaining victims were supported by the weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrates that those victims were innocent bystanders in the crosshairs of the defendant’s line of firing. There was no plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel based on the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the concept of transferred intent of self-defense. It is not definitively established in this district that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to self-defense claims. Therefore, such an instruction would have been inappropriate. The defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. In regard to one victim, the defendant told her he was shooting at her and would continue to do so. The defendant did continue to shoot at the victim even after she had dropped her weapon. In regard to the other two bystander victims, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions against the defendant under the theory of transferred intent. Further, circumstantial evidence demonstrated venue. Statements made and injuries documented by a treating nurse did not have the primary purpose of being testimonial. Rather, they were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. There was no violation of appellant’s confrontation rights regarding the nurse’s testimony and the admission of the medical records. A witness’s testimony that she recognized the scene depicted in a video, recognized the person being videotaped, and that the video was a fair and accurate representation of how the taped person appeared at the time in question was sufficient for authentication. The imposition of consecutive sentences on the firearm specifications was lawful and appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which creates an exception to the general rule that a trial court may not impose multiple sentences for firearm specifications for crimes committed as part of the same transaction. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1693 |
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State v. Flanik
| 113145 | Aggravated robbery; R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); complicit; sufficiency; manifest weight; plain error; codefendant; confront; hearsay; harmless error; plain error; prejudice; cross-examination; duress; jury instruction; ineffective assistance of counsel; merger; firearm specifications. Affirmed appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery and the sentence imposed in the case. Sufficient evidence was presented showing appellant was complicit in commission of the offense, and her conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. No plain error occurred as to the admission of certain testimony, and other evidentiary challenges were deemed harmless error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding questioning on cross-examination that was deemed hearsay, or in refusing to provide a jury instruction on the defense of duress, which was not warranted by the record. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court was required to sentence appellant on each of two firearm specifications, notwithstanding merger of the underlying felony offenses. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1689 |
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State ex rel. Onunwor v. Deputy Clerk of Courts
| 113724 | R.C. 149.43(B)(8), Sup.R. 44-47, prospective application, criminal case records, public records. Because the relator’s criminal case occurred prior to the effective date of Sup.R. 44-47, R.C. 149.43 controlled the relator’s request for records from that case. Because the relator did not obtain the necessary judicial approval required by R.C. 149.43(B)(8), the relator was not entitled to the records. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1685 |
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Mallory v. Gallagher
| 113761 | Mandamus; R.C. 2969.25(A); affidavit of prior civil actions; R.C. 2969.25(C); certified institutional cashier’s statement. The realtor has failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25, which requires the inclusion of a sworn affidavit of prior civil actions and a certified copy of the institutional cashier’s statement setting forth the balance in the inmate’s account. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/26/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1684 |
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Cleveland v. White
| 112720 | Telecommunications harassment; CCO 621.10; text messages; emails; sufficiency of the evidence; jury instruction; plain error; prejudice; admission of testimony; Evid.R. 1002; harmless error; manifest weight of the evidence; criminal complaint; defect in indictment; Crim.R. 12(C)(2); R.C. 2941.29; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in misstating the date of the offense, treating the criminal complaint as charging two offenses, or admitting testimony from the victim regarding the content of text messages. Appellant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1584 |
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Nationstar Mtge., Inc. v. Scarville
| 112270 & 113139 | Dormancy; motion to intervene; Civ.R. 24(A); Civ.R. 24(B); untimely. Trial court properly overruled motion to intervene filed by successors-in-interest to the debtor in foreclosure action because they failed to timely file the motion. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1580 |
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State v. Woods
| 113100 | Guilty plea; voluntary; pro se motion to continue; Crim.R. 11(C). The trial court did not err when it accepted Woods’s guilty plea after it addressed the defendant personally at the plea hearing, engaged in the required colloquy with him, and fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C). The trial court did not have a duty to address a pro se motion for continuance that the defendant filed the day before pleading guilty. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1589 |
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State v. Harris
| 112269 | Aggravated murder, murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under disability; sufficiency; manifest weight; mistrial; unadmitted evidence to jury; expert testimony; Evid.R. 702; Crim.R. 16; harmless error; authentication; Evid.R. 901; missing evidence; prosecutor opening statement; misstatement. Judgment affirmed. Court’s exhibit No. 5 was included with the trial exhibits in error, but no harm came to the defendant by way of the momentary possession of the court’s exhibit by the jury. Certain portions of testimony by forensic video analyst Ciula in this case consisted of expert testimony as set forth in Evid.R. 702. However, the harmless error analysis applies to those portions of Ciula’s testimony that were expert opinion testimony, and the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt in this case means that the outcome of trial would not have been different. Crim.R. 16 was complied with because the trial court exercised its discretion and found that the expert’s report was not new discovery, and even if it was, it could have been discussed when it was received, which was four days before the jury was sworn in. The state’s exhibits defendant challenges were properly authenticated by the state and admissible. Furthermore, defendant fails to demonstrate how the missing crime-scene log would have been material to the case and cannot demonstrate that the failure to preserve the crime-scene log was in bad faith. There is sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s convictions and his convictions are not against the weight of the evidence based on the testimony of the four eyewitnesses combined with the defendant’s own admission, the ankle monitor GPS data and the surveillance video identifying defendant and the shooter and placing at the scene of the crime. Lastly, the prosecutor’s isolated misstatement did not prejudicially affect the outcome of his case because defense counsel immediately brought the misstatement to the jury’s attention and the prosecutor also admitted to the jury through a witness’s testimony that he made a mistake. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1579 |
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State v. Kirby
| 112518 | Attempted rape; abduction; Rape Shield Statute; R.C. 2907.02(D); exclusion of evidence; balancing test; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; conflicting testimony; credibility determination. Defendant was convicted after trial of attempted rape and abduction. Defendant asserted on appeal the trial court erred by excluding evidence pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(D). The trial court excluded evidence that was specific to the victim’s past sexual activity and, by allowing general testimony that conversations between defendant and complainant were of a sexual nature, the trial court balanced defendant’s due process rights against the state’s interest in precluding evidence under the Rape Shield Statute. The convictions were based on sufficient evidence where the complainant’s testimony went to all elements of the crimes charged. Further, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim’s testimony was not inherently incredible, the testimony was bolstered by defendant’s apologies, and where the determination of credibility and resolving conflicts in testimony and evidence rests solely with the finder of fact. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1582 |
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Euclid v. Amiott
| 112675 | Right to speedy trial; R.C. 2945.71; extension of time; tolling; R.C. 2945.72; reasonable continuance; motion to dismiss; expiration; prima facie case for dismissal; state’s burden of production; statutory time limit; first-degree misdemeanor; 90 days after arrest or service of summons; recusal of trial judge; visiting judge assigned; no time waiver executed; sua sponte continuance; journal entry containing reasons for continuance. The trial court erred in proceeding to trial after the speedy-trial time had elapsed where appellant had not waived his right to a speedy trial. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1583 |
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State v. Keith
| 113131 | R.C. 2929.14(C); R.C. 2907.05; gross sexual imposition; R.C. 2907.03; disseminating matter harmful to juveniles; maximum sentence. Appellant’s maximum consecutive sentence totaling 30 months in prison for gross sexual imposition and disseminating matter harmful to juveniles was not contrary to law and appellant could not show that the record did not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. There was no evidence of judicial bias or favoritism. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1591 |
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Biotricity, Inc. v. DeJohn
| 113216 | Federal Arbitration Act; arbitration agreement; motion for protective order; motion to stay discovery; motion to compel arbitration. - Trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to stay discovery and for a protective order while appellants’ motion to compel arbitration remained pending was immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act, which applied to the arbitration agreements at issue, because the orders effectively denied appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1593 |
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State v. Fontanez
| 113105 | Guilty plea; motion to withdraw; change of heart. Denial of presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea affirmed where trial court failed to expressly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt where the fact of the admission was obvious and the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. Denial of presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion where trial court considered all factors necessary for evaluating a plea withdrawal request under Crim.R. 32.1. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1590 |
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Thrasher, Dinsmore & Colan, LPA v. Ross
| 113298 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); unjust enrichment; unpaid attorney fees. - Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C) on plaintiff’s unjust-enrichment claim for unpaid attorney fees regarding services plaintiff law firm rendered to defendants where there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff provided legal services, defendants knew the plaintiff was providing legal services on its behalf, and it would be unjust for defendants to retain the benefit of those services without paying for them. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1594 |
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State v. Kennedy
| 112879 | Evid.R. 404(B), ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency, and manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court’s admission of evidence during appellant’s bench trial did not violate Evid.R. 404(B). The evidence was provided to the defense prior to trial, was presented for a legitimate purpose, and the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The admission did not overcome the presumption of regularity afforded the trial court to know and follow the law. Counsel did not fail to address the issue of secondary DNA transfer and thus was not ineffective. The evidence was not insufficient as a matter of law nor were the convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1586 |
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State v. Jones
| 113082 | Motion to dismiss; preindictment delay; actual prejudice; deceased witness; rape; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); kidnapping; R.C. 2905.01(A)(4); sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss due to preindictment delay where defendant did not show that he sustained actual prejudice as a result of the preindictment delay. Considering each item of allegedly “lost” or “unavailable” evidence, including lost recording of 911 call, lost clothing, lost photographs and lost medical records, in light of other evidence available at the time of the indictment and the relevance of the allegedly unavailable evidence to the defense, defendant failed to show that the items, if available, would have meaningfully impacted his case. Speculation that deceased or missing witness could have had information favorable to defense likewise did not meet defendant’s burden of showing actual prejudice. Defendant’s convictions for rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where victim testified that sex was not consensual, witnesses testified regarding the victim’s injuries following the incident and the state presented DNA evidence from the victim’s sexual-assault examination kits that linked defendant to the rape. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1588 |
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